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Abstract  
The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the 
Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both 
package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto 
generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion 
points of the package veto and the Congress’s possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects 
of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress 
has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome 
ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines 
between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure 
programs closer to the President’s ideal point within what may be called the Congress’s indifference 
curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over 
the previous year’s budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the 
policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the classical and most important issues concerning democratic institutions is 
how such institutions affect policy outcomes. Essentially, this issue is about identifying 
the causality between institutions and policy. In particular, political scientists have been 
discussing how differences among institutions cause variations in policy outcomes, and 
what role institutions play in formulating policy1.  
 
This article examines how the institutional distribution of powers between the executive 
and the legislature in the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. Especially, we 
take a close look at the effects of the Presidential partial veto, and check whether or not 
partial veto power strengthens the President’s position2. As regards policy, we have 
chosen budget making as the topic for our discussion.  
 
Generally speaking, it is thought that if a partial veto is granted to the President in 
addition to a package veto, the President can obtain a policy outcome closer to his or her 
preferred objective. Here, “package veto” means the power to nullify an entire bill, 
while “partial veto” means the power to nullify only the items which the President 
wishes to eliminate. If the partial veto is exercised, the bill is enacted except for the 
vetoed items. Baldez and Carey (1999, 2001), using a spatial model, show the effects of 
the Presidential partial veto in Chilean budget making. They argue that by resorting to a 
partial veto, the President can achieve a policy outcome closer to his preferred objective, 
basically because the use of a partial veto eliminates different policy dimensions that 
                                                 
1 Persson and Tabellini (2003) offer a representative empirical examination of the 
effects of political institutions on fiscal policy. Acemoglu (2005) has made a significant 
critique of this work with respect to its methodology.  
2 Aside from the Philippines, the Presidential partial veto can be found in several Latin 
American countries. The list in Shugart and Carey (1992, p.155) shows that the 
constitutions of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay grant the power of veto to their Presidents. In addition, the 
Argentine president exercises a partial veto in actual practice (Jones 1997). See also 
Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) for a discussion of the presidential partial veto in Latin 
America. Alemán and Tsebelis (2005) describe the historical background of the 
presidential partial veto in Latin America. In the USA, partial veto power is granted to 
the governors of 43 states. Abney and Lauth (1997) carried out a survey of the views of 
executive and legislative budget officials regarding the effects of the powers of partial 
veto (item veto) exercised by governors on budget making, and concluded that the 
partial veto is an effective instrument for maintaining fiscal discipline. 
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may be present in the budget bill.  
 
Although Baldez and Carey emphasize the crucial effect of the partial veto, their model 
does not sufficiently admit that the budget making process can be interpreted as a 
dynamic game. By contrast, the present article deals with the budget making process as 
a dynamic game, and presents the effects of the partial veto using a simple model 
derived from game theory. By identifying the outcome of the game as sub-game 
perfection, we first confirm that the Presidential partial veto operates in favor of the 
President. But, second, we also show that such effects in favor of the President diminish 
depending on the reversion point, which is obtained when either the Congress or the 
President refuses to pass the bill. Third, we also show that the Presidential partial veto 
works to a significant degree when it is made subject to the condition that the Congress 
has the power to impose a certain level of costs (sanctions) on the President in response 
to his ex-post arbitrary action. If the Congress is unable to sanction the President in any 
way, logically the Congress always chooses to reject the bill. 
 
Although our argument will be organized along the above-mentioned lines, we still need 
to keep in mind that a policy outcome is realized not only by means of institutional 
powers allocated to the executive and the legislature. Political institutions affect policy 
outcomes roughly in three ways. Political institutions decide, first, the players who 
participate in the policy making process, second, the preferences of the players, and 
finally, the strategy sets of the players. As regards the first point, it should be noted that 
institutions, especially the constitutional framework, define the form of government, the 
procedures of policy making, and who plays a part therein. In respect of the second 
point, the players seek the policies which enable them to win elections, always 
assuming that the players have the incentive to gain power. The players’ policy 
preferences are in this sense decided by the type of electoral system. And finally, the 
distribution of institutional powers among the players, which this article focuses on, 
decides what strategies are available to each player. When the information relating to 
the available strategy sets is revealed to the players, each player chooses the strategy to 
maximize his payoff.  
 
Furthermore, we also need to remember that insofar as historical and socio-economic 
circumstances surrounding political institutions affect the players’ preferences, political 
institutions are by no means the sole determinant of policy outcomes. In this regard, 
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factors such as ethnic and religious cleavages and income inequality can exert an 
important influence. For example, if income inequality widens, class conflict over 
redistribution can intensify. The resulting conflict affects the party system, electoral 
competition and even the choices available to institutions and regimes (Boix 2003, 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).  
 
While this article recognizes the potential significance of factors such as the nature of 
political institutions and the character of the surrounding circumstances, we focus on the 
distribution of institutional powers between the executive and the legislature, as one of 
the factors that determines the policy process. 
 
We have chosen to focus on budget making for the following reasons. First of all, the 
budget making process is a crucial policy process because it represents the authoritative 
allocation of resources by government. Secondly, longitudinal comparisons are possible 
because the budget making process is repeated annually. And most important of all, we 
find the Presidential partial veto at work mostly in the budget making process3.  
 
In the following section, we present the theoretical model on which the study is based. 
We are concerned with differences in policy outcomes caused by whether or not the 
partial veto is granted to the President4. The model implies that it is likely that the 
President will achieve his or her preferred policy outcome if he or she is equipped with 
partial veto power. But, for such an outcome to be obtained, a necessary condition is 
that the reversion point provides for a smaller sized budget. In other cases, the reversion 
point is chosen as a final outcome in equilibrium. In addition, we also need the 
condition that the Congress can impose a certain level of sanctions on the President. 
Otherwise, the Congress will merely reject any budget proposal to prevent ex-post 
arbitrary action on the part of the President. In the next two sections, we discuss the 
specific case of the Philippines. After describing the characteristics of the Philippine 
presidential system, we identify the players, the players’ preferences, and the players’ 
strategy sets. We then proceed to examine the budget making process from 1994 to 2008. 
                                                 
3 In the American states, the governor’s partial veto is limited to budget making only. 
On the other hand, in Latin American countries, presidents may exercise a partial veto 
over a wider range of policies (Alemán and Tsebelis 2005, p.11).  
4 We suppose that the President has the power to propose the budget to the Congress. 
This power does not change the outcomes of the model, but we make the assumption 
since presidents in most countries are equipped with this power.  
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We find that the President was able to achieve his preferred outcome through using the 
partial veto when the fiscal balance was sound. The Congress, however, prevented 
passage of the bill when the government began to accumulate a budgetary deficit. We 
also find that the Congress was able to employ sanctions to limit the President’s 
discretion in actual processes. The case of the Philippines shows a pattern that supports 
the theoretical model on which this article is based.  
 
II. THEORETICAL MODEL: PARTIAL VETO AND REVERSION POINT 
 
If we consider budget making as a game, we can design the following model. We 
assume that there are two players in the game, namely the President (P) and the 
Congress (L). We also assume that P and L have different preferences. Such a difference 
is caused by the difference of electoral systems between P and L, or by a divided 
government where the President’s party is in a minority in the Congress.  
 
In actual cases, the President’s party sometimes controls the majority in the Congress. In 
such a situation, P and L share the same preference if the President can impose strong 
party discipline. If so, policy outcomes are decided by a single player, and the following 
model would become irrelevant. In other cases, a ruling coalition composed of several 
parties supports both the President and the majority in the Congress. In such 
circumstances we need to count each party as a player. Such cases decrease the 
significance of considering the institutional characteristics of the Presidential system. 
Additionally, there are three institutional players if the Congress is bicameral. But in 
this article, we assume two players in order to simplify the game structure. The essence 
of the logic remains the same. 
 
Here, to obtain concreteness in preferences, we suppose that P prefers more 
concentration of funds on national level projects, and that L prefers more concentration 
on local level projects which benefit local constituencies5. We may further suppose that 
L prefers that funding for local projects benefits specific groups. Furthermore, we 
assume that the total amount of the budget is limited, and that allocations for national 
and local projects are not decided independently. In other words, if one type of project is 
                                                 
5 Here, the “local level projects” refers to projects applied to limited geographical areas. 
The “national level projects” include projects that are implemented at local level, but 
national level projects are applied nationwide, under the President’s supervision.   
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given a more generous allocation, another type receives less6. We denote the available 
total funds for distribution in the budget as w (which excludes mandatory expenditure 
such as salaries and wages), and the distribution ratio for national level project 
as ߨ א ሺ0,1ሻ. The amount of funds for national level projects, therefore, is expressed as 
ߨ · ݓ and the amount of funds for local level projects is expressed as  ሺ1 െ ߨሻ · ݓ. 
 
The reversion points of veto differ among various countries. In many of the countries 
with Presidential systems, the previous year’s budget is set as the reversion point, either 
temporarily or permanently. In other countries, the President’s budget proposal 
constitutes the reversion point7. In this article, we take the previous year’s budget as the 
reversion point. The available resource for distribution at the time of t is, thus, 
expressed as ݓ௧, and that of the reversion point is given as ݓ௧ିଵ. We also assume that 
the ratio of distribution at the reversion point is same as that of the previous year. The 
overall logic for explaining the role of the reversion point can be held through 
incorporating the variation of the reversion point’s characteristics into the nature of 
previous year’s budget. It should be noted that the Congress holds veto power as it can 
prevent a bill from being enacted, although in formal terms, the veto power is explicitly 
granted only to the President in most of the constitutions of the eleven countries. 
 
A. Model 1: The President has the package veto only 
Let us proceed to consider two different cases. One is the case where the President holds 
a package veto only, and the other is the case where the President holds both package 
and partial vetoes. When only the President is allowed to exercise a package veto, the 
game proceeds as follows (Figure 1). At first, the President (P) submits the budget 
proposal to the Congress (L). There is a constraint on the total amount, and P decides ߨ 
within the operating constraint. After receiving the proposal, L decides whether it will 
                                                 
6 Baldez and Carey (1999, 2001) do not assume this constraint, with the result that it is 
easy to separate the two dimensions in their framework. That said, a budget constraint 
assumption captures the reality of the actual budget making processes in various 
countries. 
7 The OECD (2003) shows that the reversion points are as follows: the Presidential 
budget proposals in three countries; the previous year’s budget in four countries; and the 
Congress’s temporary budget in one country. Among the eleven countries selected by 
the research group, three are members of the OECD, while eight are not. In specific 
terms, the President’s proposal is always the reversion point in Chile, but is only 
tentative in Bolivia and Mexico. In Argentina, Colombia, Indonesia and Uruguay, the 
previous year’s budget is carried over when the budget bill is not enacted. 
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revise ߨ, or reject the proposal totally. If L decides to reject the proposal, the game ends 
and we obtain the reversion point, the previous year’s budget, as the outcome. The ratio 
of distribution to national level projects at the reversion point is denoted as ߨො א ሺ0,1ሻ, 
and the total available resource for the distribution is denoted as ݓ௧ିଵ. Hence the total 
amount distributed for the national level projects is ߨො · ݓ௧ିଵ, and the total amount for 
local projects is ሺ1 െ ߨොሻ · ݓ௧ିଵ. We consider these as payoffs between the President and 
the Congress. It should be noted that the reversion point does not necessarily provide 
the same utility as those enjoyed by P and L in the previous year. The reversion point 
does not provide funds for the new projects which may have gained significance owing 
to a change in circumstances. The failure of budget enactment itself also has a negative 
impact on external relations. However we omit such costs in this model, in order to 
make the logic clear for focusing on a comparison of the package and the partial vetoes8. 
In this setting, P obtains the payoff, ߨො · ݓ௧ିଵ, and L obtains ሺ1 െ ߨොሻ · ݓ௧ିଵ at the 
reversion point. 
 
On the other hand, the game proceeds to the next stage if L amends P’s proposal and 
sets L’s preferred distribution ratio,  ߨ ൌ ߨ௅. Responding to this action of L, P decides 
whether to accept the amendment or refuse it. If P exercises the veto, the reversion point 
is obtained as the outcome, and P and L receive the pay offs of ߨො · ݓ௧ିଵ  and 
ሺ1 െ ߨොሻ · ݓ௧ିଵ respectively. If P accepts L’s amendment, the payoffs are ߨ௅ · ݓ௧ିଵ for 
P and ሺ1 െ ߨ௅ሻ · ݓ௧ିଵ for L. 
 
                                                 
8 Such costs, however, affect the actual budget making process. As time passes, changes 
occur in the circumstances that surround policy issues. Governments have to deal with 
new policy needs and the old budget cannot always respond to such needs. Moreover 
the reversion budget may not fit the election cycle. Such costs are imposed on both the 
President and the Congress. As the costs increase, the incentives for the players to avoid 
the reversion grow stronger.  
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Figure 1 Budget Game without Partial Veto 
Outcome reve
 
In this game, Outcome C (new budget) is obtained, if ݓ௧ ൒ ݓ௧ିଵ. On the other hand, 
Outcome A (reversion) is obtained, if ݓ௧ ൏ ݓ௧ିଵ. 
 
Sub-game perfection consists of the following strategic profiles of P and L: 
 
(1) If ݓ௧ ൒ ݓ௧ିଵ , 
                     ߪ௅ ൌ             ݏ݁ݐ ߨො ·
௪೟షభ
೟௪
 ܽݏ ߨ௅ 
                                            ߪ௣ሺߨ௅ሻ ൌ    ܽ݌݌ݎ݋ݒ݁, ݂݅ ߨ ൒ ߨො ·
௪೟షభ
௪೟
௅  
     ݒ݁ݐ݋, ݂݅ ߨ௅ ൏ ߨො ·
௪೟
௪
షభ
೟
  
Outcome C is obtained, and the payoffs of P and L are ߨ௅ · ݓ௧, and .ሺ1 െ ߨ௅ሻ · ݓ௧ 
 
 
 
P PL 
set ߨ 
change ߨ to ߨ௅ approve 
veto 
 A ( rsion)
ߨො · ݓ௧ିଵ, ሺ1 െ ߨොሻ · ݓ௧ିଵ 
Outcome B (reversion
ߨ
)
ො · ݓ௧ିଵ, ሺ1 െ ߨොሻ · ݓ௧ିଵ 
veto 
O tcom  C (n w budgu e e  et) 
ߨ௅ · ݓ௧, ሺ1 െ ߨ௅ሻ · ݓ௧ 
* P obtains the former payoff, while L obtains the latter at each outcome. 
Source: Author 
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(2) If ݓ௧ ൏ ݓ௧ିଵ, 
                                                 ߪ௅ ൌ     ݎ݆݁݁ܿݐ ሺݒ݁ݐ݋ሻ
                                            ߪ௣ሺߨ௅ሻ ൌ    ܽ݌݌ݎ݋ݒ݁, ݂݅ ߨ௅ ൒ ߨො ·
௪೟షభ
௪೟
 
                              ݒ݁ݐ݋, ݂݅ ߨ௅ ൏ ߨො ·
௪೟షభ
௪೟
 
Outcome A is obtained, and the payoffs of P and L are ߨො · ݓ௧ିଵ and  ሺ1 െ ߨොሻ · ݓ௧ିଵ. 
 
In the case of equilibrium (1) (new budget outcome), the realized ߨ௅ in the new budget 
is as indicated in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 ࣊ࡸ in a Budget Making Game without Partial Veto 
ߨො
1 
ߨ ൌ ߨො 
ߨ௅ ൌ ߨො ·
ݓ௧ିଵ
ݓ௧
 
1 
ߨ 
w୲ିଵ
w୲
 
Source: Author 
 
 
7 
 
If the President is not allowed to exercise a partial veto, and if the total budgetary 
resource for distribution is larger than that of the previous year,  ߨ௅ in equilibrium is 
lower than the previous year’s ratio ߨො. This outcome is preferable for the Congress. In 
short, if the President’s power is limited to a package veto, the outcome approaches 
closer to the Congress’s ideal point. Nonetheless, as the gap between the current 
available resource and the resource in the previous year shrinks, ߨ௅ moves closer to ߨො. 
This is because ௪೟షభ
௪೟
 moves closer to 1 in the figure. We can say that the gap between 
the current resource and that of the reversion point affects the level of ߨ௅.  
 
B. Model 2: The President has both the package and partial vetoes 
Let us now consider the case in which the President holds partial veto power, and where 
the partial veto enables the President to eliminate certain items in a bill. With this power, 
the President wins an additional action in his game strategy. In addition to approving 
Congress’s bill or vetoing the entire bill, the President can virtually modify the bill at 
the last stage. The game goes as follows. First the President (P) submits the proposal 
and sets ߨ. The Congress (L) decides whether to approve the bill but with modification 
of the distribution ratio to ߨ௅, or to reject the proposal and return to the reversion point. 
Until this point, the process is the same as in model 1. If L modifies the bill, P can 
exercise his or her partial veto to remove or alter certain items contained in the budget 
bill. For example the President can reduce the distribution of resources to local level 
projects, or he can restore cuts in the distribution of funds to national level projects 
without nullifying the entire bill. The President can delete the article which limits 
national level expenditure if the Congress’s bill contains such an article. The President 
can also eliminate any item that provides additional new funds to local level projects 
created by the Congress. The partial veto enables the President to reset ߨ, that is to say, 
to change L’s ideal ratio ߨ௅ to P’s ideal ratio ߨ௉. This amounts to a virtual modification 
of the bill. 
 
Model 2 is different from the model 1 insofar as the partial veto is put in the President’s 
strategy set. We need another modification in the model to make it more viable, and the 
modification is that of taking the cost imposed on the President by the Congress into 
consideration. Such a cost arises if the budget is approved by the President with some 
changes. In real terms, the cost is the Congress’s refusal to cooperate with the President 
in other legislative processes, or in relation to other political events, when the 
President’s partial veto reduces the Congress’s payoff9. This cost can be denoted as: 
                                                 
9 We can suppose that this cost occurs even in Outcome B of model 1 (the President 
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ܥሺߨ௉ሻ ൌ
ߙ
2
· ߨ௉ଶ 
We suppose the parameter α ൒ 0 indicates the level of Congress’s influence over the 
President. When we consider this cost in the model, the game can be expressed as in 
Figure 3. 
 
P sets ߨ 
PL 
change ߨ to ߨ௅ 
veto 
Outcome A (r ve ersion)
ߨො · ݓ௧ିଵ, ሺ1 െ ߨොሻ · ݓ௧ିଵ 
O tcome  (reversion)
ߨ
u  B
O tcome C (new udget)u  b  
ො · ݓ௧ିଵ, ሺ1 െ ߨොሻ · ݓ௧ିଵ 
ߨ௉ · ݓ௧ െ ܥሺߨ௉ሻ, ሺ1 െ ߨ௉ሻ · ݓ௧
change ߨ௅ to ߨ௉ 
veto 
P 
Figure 3 Budget Game with Partial Veto 
* P obtains the former payoff, while L obtains the latter at each outcome. 
Source: Author 
Suppose ߨ௉כ  is the value of ߨ௉  which maximizes the P’s payoff at Outcome C, 
provided we assume that ߨො · ݓ௧ିଵ ൑ ߨ௉כ · ݓ௧ െ ܥሺߨ௉כሻ is always satisfied. Through the 
first order condition, we obtain, 
 
ߨ௉כ ൌ
௪೟
ఈ
 . 
 
In this game, if ݓ௧ ൒ ݓ௧ିଵ ,  Outcome C (new budget) is obtained as long as ߙ is large 
                                                                                                                                               
exercises a package veto and the reversion point is obtained). But this cost does not 
change as a function of the degree of the veto. 
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enough. If ߙ is too small, or if ݓ௧ ൐ ݓ௧ିଵ , Outcome A (reversion) is the final result. 
The strategic profile of the President and of the Congress that induces sub-game 
perfection is as follows: 
(1) if ݓ௧ ൒ ݓ௧ିଵ , 
                                                    ߪ௅ ൌ      ݏ݁ݐ  ߨ௅  ܽݐ ܮᇱݏ ݈݅݀݁ܽ  ݅݊ݐ, ݂݅ ߙ ൒
௪೟మ
௪೟ିሺଵିగෝሻ௪೟షభ
݌݋  
                                ݒ݁ݐ݋, ݂݅ ߙ ൏
ݓ௧ଶ
െ ߨොሻݓ௧ିଵݓ௧ െ ሺ1
 
ߪ௣ሺߨ௅ሻ ൌ   ݏ݁ݐ  ߨ௉כ ൌ
ݓ௧
ߙ
 ܽݏ ߨ௉ 
Outcome A or C will be obtained depending on the Congress’s influence parameter ߙ. If 
the Congress’s influence is small, Outcome A is obtained. The President and the 
Congress obtain ߨො · ݓ௧ିଵ  and ሺ1 െ ߨොሻ · ݓ௧ିଵ  respectively. If such an influence is 
large enough, Outcome C is obtained. The payoffs are ߨ௉כ · ݓ௧ െ ܥሺߨ௉כሻ  and 
ሺ1 െ ߨכሻ · ݓ  under the new budget. ௉ ௧
(2) If ݓ௧ ൏ ݓ௧ିଵ, 
 
ߪ ൌ       ݎ݆݁݁ܿݐ ሺݒ ݐ݋ሻ 
               ߪ௣ሺߨ௅ሻ ൌ    ݏ݁ݐ  ߨ௉כ ൌ
ݓ௧
ߙ
௅ ݁
 ܽݏ ߨ௉ 
 
Outcome A is obtained, since ߨ௉כ ൐ ߨො is always satisfied because of the assumption 
that. ߨො · ݓ௧ିଵ ൑ ߨ௉כ · ݓ௧ െ ܥሺߨ௉כሻ. The budget is not enacted. The President and the 
Congress get the payoffs of ߨො · ݓ௧ିଵ and ሺ1 െ ߨොሻ · ݓ௧ିଵ respectively. 
 
In this game (Model 2), the budget is enacted, when the total resource for distribution is 
much larger than that of the previous budget, and when the Congress has the means to 
impose sanctions on the President. Otherwise, the budget is not enacted. In other words, 
the conditions to enact a budget under Model 2 are much stricter than those under 
Model 1.  
 
When the budget is enacted (if ݓ௧ ൒ ݓ௧ିଵ ), the obtained distribution rate ߨ௉כ  satisfies 
the conditions: 
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ߨ௉כ ൌ
௪೟
ఈ
 
                         ߙ ൒
ݓ௧ଶ
ݓ௧ െ ሺ1 െ ߨොሻݓ௧ିଵ
 
 
These conditions can be expressed as in Figure 4. 
ߨ௉כ ൌ
ݓ௧
ߙ
 
ݓ௧
ߙ
ݓ௧
ݓ௧ െ ሺ1 െ ߨොሻ · ݓ௧ିଵ
 
Figure 4 The Value of ૈ۾כ  in Model 2 (the budget game with partial veto) 
ߨ௉כ
ݓ௧ െ ሺ1 െ ߨොሻ · ݓ௧ିଵ
ݓ௧
 
1 
ߨො 
0 
ߙ
If ݓ௧ ൒ ݓ௧ିଵ 
Source: Author 
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Figure 4 differs from Figure 2, insofar as the X axis indicates α, the level of the 
Congress’s influence over the President. Figure 4 implies that the President can obtain 
the preferable outcome (ߨ௉כ ൒ ߨො,  more distribution for the national level projects), if the 
Congress has influence over the President in certain degree (if  ௪೟
మ
௪೟ିሺଵିగෝሻ·௪೟షభ
൑ ߙ ൑ ௪೟
గෝ
ሻ. 
 
The gap between the amount of available resources at the current budget and that of the 
reversion point, however, affects the ratio of distribution, just as in Model 1. As the gap 
shrinks, the ratio of distribution ߨ௉כ ൌ
௪೟
ఈ
 becomes smaller, and the magnitude of the 
President’s superiority diminishes.  
 
C. Implications of the models 
In Model 1 (without the partial veto), the strategic profile that provides a favorable 
outcome for the Congress constitutes equilibrium as sub-game perfection with a greater 
probability. In Model 2 (with partial veto), the strategic profile which provides a 
favorable outcome for the President constitutes equilibrium as sub-game perfection with 
a larger probability. Through comparison of the two models, we can conclude that the 
President’s partial veto power works in favor of the President. In addition, we obtained 
the theoretical prediction that the conditions for budget enactment are more restricted if 
the President holds partial veto power. 
 
When we consider the effects of partial veto powers on budget making, we find two 
important conditions. The first is the gap between the amount of available resources for 
distribution in the current budget and that at the reversion point. Figure 2 and Figure 4 
indicate that both the Congress and the President find it hard to realize their preferred 
outcomes, apart from the reversion point ሺߨොሻ, if the gap is too small. Moreover, the 
reversion point always constitutes equilibrium, if the amount of available resources at 
the reversion point is larger than that available for current budget making (ݓ௧ ൏ ݓ௧ିଵሻ. 
 
The second condition is the extent of the Congress’s ability to sanction the President in 
cases where the President takes ex-post arbitrary actions that work against the 
Congress’s interests. If the President can reduce the Congress’s payoff through use of 
the partial veto after the Congress has approved the budget proposals, the Congress 
always rejects (in effect vetoes) the budget proposals before the President exercises his 
partial veto in order to contain the President’s freedom of action. The reversion point is 
always brought into play, and the government falls into gridlock. The President’s partial 
veto, however, becomes limited within the Congress’s range of indifference, provided 
that the Congress can impose sanctions on the President in response to the President’s 
arbitrary action. If Congressional sanctions come into play, a new budget is enacted in 
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equilibrium. In a Presidential system, the executive (the President) has less power to 
control the legislature (the Congress) than in a parliamentary system. Under a 
Presidential system, moreover, a divided government causes political gridlock. If the 
arbitrary usage of a partial veto brings about gridlock in the policy-making process, the 
President needs to pay a high cost for management of the government. The function 
 ܥሺߨ௉ሻ is intended to insert such costs into the model. Theoretically, a new budget can 
be enacted just because the President faces such costs.  
 
The models indicate that policy outcomes, including especially the budget outcome, are 
affected by whether or not the President has a partial veto, what the reversion point is, 
and the severity of the sanctions that the Congress can impose on the President. In other 
words, while the partial veto can be seen as enhancing the authority of the President, its 
effect diminishes along with the gap between the amount of the resources that are 
currently available, and the amount of the resources that were approved at the reversion 
point. The smaller the gap becomes, the more likely it is that there will be a return to the 
reversion point.  
 
To test the validity of the theoretical model, we will now consider the case of the 
Philippines. 
 
III THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
A. Players 
It is useful to divide the players in the policy making process into institutional players 
and partisan players 10 . The identity of the institutional players is determined by 
institutions, and especially by the constitutional framework. In the Presidential system, 
the institutional players consist of the President, the Senate, the House of 
Representatives, and the Supreme Court. The identity of the partisan players, which 
consist of the political parties and factions, is determined by the political system. If the 
majority of the Congress is composed of several parties, we need to count each party. If 
on the other hand the President’s party holds the majority in the Congress, the number 
                                                 
10 Tsebelis (2002) discusses this distinction in his analysis of veto players. Cox and 
McCubbins (2001) in arguing the effects of institutions, emphasize the need to 
distinguish between the separation of power and the separation of purpose in arguing 
the effects of institutions.  
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of players is closer to one.  
 
Using the distinction between institutional players and partisan players, we can identify 
three dominant players in the policy making process in the Philippines, especially in the 
process of drawing up the budget. They are institutional players, namely, the President, 
the Senate, and the House of Representatives. Partisan players are not included as key 
players here because political parties are not cohesive in the Philippines. Political 
parties have been fluid and unstable ever since democratization in 1986 (Kasuya 2008). 
Political parties usually flourish just before the Presidential elections, and politicians 
defect to the President’s party after the elections. The majority (mostly the President’s 
allies) and the minority in the House disagree over a number of issues. But conflict is 
generally caused not so much by policy differences as by competition over the 
distribution of resources. A high degree of income inequality in the country seems to be 
responsible for producing class based parties such as a laborers’ party and a peasants’ 
party. In reality, however, we cannot find such parties as dominant groupings in the 
Congress. 
 
The weak party system has been caused by the institutional setup, and is particularly a 
product of the executive and electoral systems. If the government takes a parliamentary 
form, or if the electoral system is one of proportional representation, the party leaders 
have strong control over party members. In the Philippines, twenty percent of the House 
seats are allotted on the basis of limited proportional representation, or in other words 
through application of a “party list” system. But this is quite restricted because one 
party is allowed to have a maximum of three seats. Rather, the institutional setup of the 
presidential system along with a single member district system for the House produces a 
trend in which politicians are individually independent and supported by their own 
personal bases in their respective bailiwicks. Moreover, because of their limited capacity, 
political parties do not play a determining role in election campaigns, nor are they the 
main providers of financial support. Election campaigns, rather, are organized by 
individual candidates. Hence, it is possible for candidates who have failed to be 
nominated by any of the dominant parties to simply establish their own new party. As it 
happens, candidates who defected from dominant parties won the Presidential elections 
in 1992 and 199811. As the Presidential and the Congressional elections are conducted 
                                                 
11 Fidel Ramos, who lost the party nomination of the dominant LDP in 1992, 
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simultaneously, local candidates decide which party they belong to based on which 
Presidential candidate they wish to identify themselves with. This pattern has been 
repeated every six years. 
 
The institutional players are important because each of them shares common interests 
beyond those of the partisan grouping. The President, who is an individual player, 
obviously has no interest in party conflict. Although the House is a collective player, its 
members are relatively unified in claiming their interests against the President and the 
Senate. The electoral system and the promotion of political careers defined by the 
institutional framework form a commonality of interest within each of the institutions 
concerned. Instead, it is institutional cleavage that often causes conflict among 
institutional players12.  
 
Table 1 The President and the Congress under the 1987 Constitution 
 President Senate House of Representatives 
Number １ 24 216 (Single Member District) + 
Maximum 50 (proportional 
representation)* 
Term 6 years 6 years 3 years 
Term Limit No reelection No consecutive three terms No consecutive four terms 
Constituency National National Single Member District + 
National  
Electoral 
System  
Plural Plural by bloc voting (12 
names) 
Plural + Limited proportional 
representation 
* As of November, 2008. Actual number of proportional representatives is 22. 
Source: Author 
 
Table 1 shows in diagrammatic form the electoral system in terms of the three 
institutional players. The President is elected by a national constituency. Since the 
                                                                                                                                               
established his own party, Lakas-NUCD, and won the election. Likewise, Joseph 
Estrada, who defected from the old Liberal Party, created a coalition called LAMP in 
1998, and was elected.  
12 The shift from the Presidential system to the parliamentary system has been proposed 
and discussed since the 1987 constitution was enacted, because gridlock was often 
caused by disagreements among the institutional players.  
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President has no second term, he or she finds that current payoffs are much more 
significant than future ones. The weak party system also prevents the President from 
retaining power through a political party after retirement. The President, therefore, 
focuses on maintaining a stable administration during his or her current term. By 
contrast, the senators seek reelection and even hope to step up to higher positions such 
as President and Vice President. Since the senators are all elected from the same 
national constituency, they basically compete with each other. Hence, the Senate is the 
least cohesive of the three institutional players. The Senate, however, has a common 
preference that differs from those of other two players. To ensure election within a 
national constituency, the senators are much concerned with their public image as 
portrayed by the national media, and one way for a senator to become widely known 
among the public is to attack the other two players, demanding, for instance, 
investigation of scandals allegedly involving the President and/or the corruption of 
House members By contrast, the House members do not compete with each other to be 
elected, because they are mostly elected from single member districts. Their main 
concern is how to steer resources toward their own constituencies for cultivating their 
“personal votes” (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987). The common interest of the House 
as one collective player seems to matter for the members more than shared partisan 
interests.  
 
B. Preferences 
As mentioned above, political institutions decide the identity of the three players who 
have different preferences due to the electoral system. We will now take a closer look at 
their actual preferences in the budget making process13. 
 
The House has a clear preference. House members give much attention to establishing 
and maintaining their respective political machines in their own districts, such political 
machines being the pillars of their election campaigns14. For sustaining their political 
machines, House members need to secure and distribute resources for their local 
constituencies. Distributions include the provision of both public goods (roads, water 
                                                 
13 Eaton (2002) also stresses the difference of preferences brought about by the 
electoral system. He shows that the House members are inclined to secure “personal 
votes” because the electoral system promotes candidate-centered elections, rather than 
party entered ones. 
14 See Kawanaka (2004) for local political machines in the Philippines. 
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systems, and drainage) and private transfers (support for individual residents). For 
house members, such distributions secure their “personal votes”. The House members, 
therefore, seek to maximize the distribution of benefits for their local constituencies in 
the budget making process, thus employing mechanisms that are essentially “pork 
barrel” in nature15. What makes the case of the Philippines distinctive is that House 
members and even senators have the authority to identify specific projects to support 
from within their allocated “pork barrel” funds. Each member of the House is given a 
fixed amount of funds in the budget, and he or she can choose at his or her discretion 
specific projects to be paid for using the funds concerned. After the House members 
decide on their particular projects, the relevant departments of the government carry out 
the actual implementation. The description of the pork barrel item in the budget has 
changed over the years from one government to another. First, under the Ramos 
administration, it was called the “Countrywide Development Fund”, and then it was 
changed to the “Priority Development Assistance Fund” under the Estrada 
administration. But the system has been much the same regardless of nomenclature. The 
budget for the Department of Public Works and Highways is partially used for this 
purpose, too. For example, in the fiscal year 2002, each senator received 150 million 
peso’s worth of pork barrel funds while each House member received a 50 million peso 
allocation. Using these funds, each member of the House implements road construction, 
the establishment of water systems and drainage facilities, and programs for promoting 
health and education in his or her district. Not surprisingly, the House members seek to 
enlarge the pork barrel funds in the budget making process. 
 
The President’s preference differs markedly from that of the House. The President is not 
elected from a small constituency, and he has no reelection incentive due to the limit 
that is placed on his or her term of office16. The President, therefore, prefers to allocate 
resources to national level projects that are managed under his discretion. These projects 
include servicing the national debt, providing counterpart funds for foreign assisted 
projects, extending various nationwide subsidies, and allocating Presidential 
                                                 
15 See Ferejohn (1974) for pork barrel in American politics. 
16 The President gives attention to the continuation of his own party’s strength, but this 
does not provide an alternative incentive. Even if his party continues to hold the 
presidency after his retirement, there is no guarantee that he will keep his influence over 
the party. The new party leader will monopolize influence, and the preceding President 
cannot expect to retain the loyalty of his successor. In short, the incumbent has no 
guaranteed payoff after his retirement.  
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discretionary funds (the contingent fund and the calamity fund). The President, who 
cannot run in future elections, also prefers to concentrate on maintaining a sound fiscal 
balance, reflecting his concern over the provision of stable government management in 
his current term of office. Nonetheless, the President is not totally free from the need to 
take local projects into account. If the President ignores the importance of providing 
pork barrel, he loses the means to exercise influence over the Congress. As mentioned 
above, the House members need pork barrel allocations for their political survival. If the 
release of funds is agreed by the President, the House members may provide 
concessions to the President in exchange for funding for their pet projects. The 
President’s power over the release of funds, which will be discussed later, is the key to 
gaining the Congress’s support for the President’s policy initiatives, especially when the 
President cannot control the Congress through the party line due to the innate 
incoherence of the parties (Eaton 2002, Kasuya 2008). Constrained by this limitation, 
the President tries to expand the national projects.  
 
Senators have a reelection incentive and are also concerned with the future development 
of their own political careers. They are elected from a national constituency, and their 
further political careers also depend on their ability to achieve nationwide popularity. It 
follows that senators seek to make themselves known at the national level. In addition, 
unlike the President, senators do not need to involve themselves in the day-to-day 
business of administration and management. In this context, taking a stance on fighting 
corruption is one of their favorite stratagems. Senators sometimes claim to be keen to 
abolish or slash pork barrel funds, so as to give the impression that they are committed 
to fighting corruption. In this sense, senators are different from the House members, 
who are more preoccupied with the actual distribution of funds rather than with their 
own personal images17. Be that as it may, pork barrel distribution does not necessarily 
lie totally outside the concern of the senators. Senators need the support of local 
politicians to ensure their election, and in fact they distribute funds in response to 
requests from local officials. The senators do so, however, to a lesser extent than the 
House members.  
 
 
                                                 
17 For example, when the media began to criticize pork barrel in 1996, senators 
announced their intention to abolish the fund. See Carlito Pablio, “Congress Kickbacks: 
How Much for Whom,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 13, 1996.  
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C. Powers 
The Presidential budgetary powers in the Philippines are set out in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 The Presidential Budgetary Powers in the Philippines 
Veto 1． Package Veto (which the Congress can override 
with the support of 2/3 of total members) 
2． Partial Veto 
Gate Keeping / Agenda 
Setting 
1． Exclusive Introduction of Budget Proposal 
2． Ceiling Set through Proposed Budget 
Decree  None. Except for the power to set implementing 
guidelines through executive orders.  
Reversion Carry over of the Previous Budget 
Implementation 1． Fund Transfer among Items 
2． Controlling Fund Release 
 
The President holds a superior position in budget making as compared with his position 
in ordinary legislation. Among the special powers given to the President for budget 
making are (1) partial veto power, (2) exclusive introduction of personal proposals, and 
(3) the setting of a ceiling, which is not allowed for in the other legislative processes. 
He is also given the power to control the actual release of funds. Partial veto power 
allows the President to delete certain items in the budget bill without rejecting the entire 
bill. If the President is given solely a package veto, he has only two choices for the 
Congress’ version of the budget bill, namely whether to take it or leave it. But with 
partial veto power, the President can virtually revise the bill by separating it into pieces 
and eliminating only those items that he objects to. The President’s exclusive right to 
introduce a budget bill means that the President monopolizes the power to propose a bill. 
In other words, the Congress is not allowed to make its own proposal. Finally, the 
ceiling set means that the Congress cannot revise the President’s budget proposal to 
increase the total amount of funding. The Congress can only revise the contents of the 
bill within the total amount set by the President. The exclusive introduction and the 
ceiling set define the starting point of the budget-making process as well as the possible 
range of the bargaining.  
 
The partial veto and the existence of Presidential discretion over the actual release of 
funds make it possible for the President to revise the budget enacted by the Congress 
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during the final phase of the budget making process. In addition, it should be noted that 
the previous year’s budget constitutes the reversion point. This is an important 
consideration when we discuss the theoretical model on which this article is based. 
Another important point, particularly in the case of the Philippines, is that the Congress 
is not allowed to revise the expenditure for debt repayment. Presidential Decree No. 
1177, which was imposed under President Marcos’s dictatorship, stipulates that the 
servicing of the government’s debts is automatically appropriated. The decree remains 
valid even though the Marcos regime collapsed in 1986. In that it secures credibility 
concerning the country’s ability to repay foreign donors, the decree is an indispensable 
instrument that enables the President to manage the country’s foreign debt.  
 
IV. OUTCOMES OF FINANCIAL POLICY AND  
CASES OF BUDGET MAKING 
 
A. Outcomes of Fiscal Policy 
Given the realities of the above-mentioned institutional framework, how is the budget 
making process carried out?  
 
In the first place, it should be noted that the expenditure of the Philippine government is 
relatively small in size. Figure 5 plots the expenditure sizes of 188 countries’ 
governments in terms of ratio to the gross domestic product (GDP) as of 2000. This 
figure indicates how small the Philippine government’s expenditure is. 
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The expenditure size has been small over a long period because on the one hand, it is 
not easy to carry out the legislation needed for revenue expansion, and on the other, 
because the institutional framework enables the President to restrain the size of the 
budget. The small expenditure size means amongst other things that obligatory spending 
(for example on wages and salaries, and on maintenance) occupies a relatively large 
portion of the entire budget. In that sense, in the Philippines, the budgetary funds to be 
competed for between the President and the Congress are far from abundant.  
 
Figure 6 shows the ratios of government expenditure, the revenue and the surplus to 
GDP between1988 and 1996.  
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In the Philippines, revenue increased after the 1986 democratization, and initially the 
fiscal balance showed an improvement. The balance turned into a positive surplus under 
the Ramos administration. The revenue, however, declined after 1998 following the 
Asian financial crisis, and fiscal conditions deteriorated under the Estrada and Arroyo 
administrations. The Arroyo administration started slashing the expenditure after 2005, 
and has improved the fiscal balance, though revenue remains at a low level.  
 
The most appropriate way to test our theoretical model would be to use data on the 
budgetary shares of national level projects and local level projects. Unfortunately, 
however, it is difficult to obtain relevant data, because we need to check each item, one 
by one, in order to extract the information that we need. Identifying pork barrel funds is 
also not easy as they are inserted in several items aside from those that are explicitly 
pork barrel in nature. Instead, we have inspected budget making processes from fiscal 
year 1995 to 2008, and have examined the extent to which the actual processes have 
confirmed the pattern implied by our model. The key points are whether the President is 
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able to exercise the partial veto to revise the budget and to make the final version 
preferable for him, and whether a decrease of available resources induces Congress to 
veto the budget.  
 
B. Cases of Budget Making 
If we look in detail at the budget making processes from fiscal year 1995 to 2008, it is 
clear that for the whole of the period in question, the President never exercised a 
package veto18. In contrast, the President exercised a partial veto almost every year. 
Another significant point is that the budgets were enacted from 1995 to 2000 even if the 
processes were delayed. But after 2001, the Congress failed to enact the budget on three 
occasions. The processes became severely delayed even though the budget bills were 
approved in the end. Table 3 shows the dates of approval at several stages in the budget 
making process for each of the years in question. If we consider the fiscal balance 
shown in Figure 6, the budget making process began running into gridlock after the 
steep fall in the surplus in 1998. Thus gridlocks have coincided with deterioration in the 
fiscal balance. It should be noted that the President’s party held the majority in the 
Congress consistently in these years. At least in terms of political parties, the 
Philippines did not experience a divided government during these years. Gridlocks, in 
other words, have not been the result of divided government.  
 
Table 3 The Approval Dates of Budget Bills 
Fiscal 
Year 
Administra
tion 
President’s 
Proposal 
House 
Approval 
Senate 
Approval 
Bicameral 
Conference 
Committee 
President’s 
Approval 
1995 Ramos July 25, 
1994 
Oct. 25, 
1994 
Dec. 17, 
1994 
Dec. 20, 
1994 
Dec. 30, 
1994 
1996 Ramos July 24, 
1995 
Nov. 6, 
1995 
Dec. 15, 
1995 
Dec. 21, 
1995 
Dec. 29, 
1995 
1997 Ramos July 22, 
1996 
Nov. 4, 
1996 
Dec. 17, 
1996 
Jan. 29, 
1996 
Feb. 12, 
1997 
                                                 
18 The author used the database of Business World, CODEX, to obtain relevant 
information on budget making processes. The cases have been selected for fiscal 
year1995 and after because CODEX provides news articles only from 1994 up to the 
present.  
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1998 Ramos July 28, 
1997 
Nov. 20, 
1997 
Dec. 17, 
1997 
Jan. 12, 
1998 
Feb. 14, 
1998 
1999 Estrada Aug. 22, 
1998 
Nov. 19, 
1998 
Dec. 11, 
1998 
Dec. 21, 
1998 
Dec. 30, 
1998 
2000 Estrada July 27, 
1999 
Nov. 15, 
1999 
Dec. 13, 
1999 
Feb. 2, 2000 Feb. 16, 
2000 
2001 Estrada / 
Arroyo 
July 24, 
2000 
Dec. 19, 
2000 
Not 
approved 
*** *** 
2002 Arroyo Aug. 8, 
2001 
Nov. 20, 
2001 
Dec. 18, 
2001 
Dec. 22, 
2001 
Jan. 21, 
2002 
2003 Arroyo Aug. 21, 
2001 
Dec. 18, 
2002 
March 6, 
2003 
March 12, 
2003 
April 23, 
2003 
2004 Arroyo Aug. 6, 
2003 
Dec. 17, 
2003 
Jan. 23, 
2004 
Not 
approved 
*** 
2005* Arroyo Aug. 25, 
2004 
Dec. 9, 
2004 
Feb. 10, 
2005 
March 1, 
2005 
March 15, 
2005 
2006 Arroyo Aug. 24, 
2005 
April 5, 
2006 
June 1, 
2006 
Not 
approved 
*** 
2007 Arroyo Aug. 23, 
2006 
Oct. 20, 
2006 
Dec. 4, 
2006 
Jan. 24, 
2007 
March 22, 
2007 
2008 Arroyo Aug. 22, 
2007 
Nov. 11, 
2007 
Dec. 11, 
2007 
Jan. 28, 
2008 
March 11, 
2008 
* The Senate approved the Senate version of the budget on Feb. 10, 2005 but it later approved the 
House version on March 1, 2005 without any revision, just in order to enact the budget law.  
Source: The Author, based on the Business World CODEX.  
 
This pattern described fits the theoretical model proposed earlier in this article. If the 
reversion point is the previous year’s budget and if the reversion budget provides a 
greater quantity of resources than the current budget proposal, the reversion point is 
obtained as equilibrium. For example, for the fiscal year 2004 budget when the budget 
deficit widened, the House members discussed the possibility of obtaining the reversion 
budget even at an early stage in the budget making process. For the fiscal year 2005, the 
House was inclined to opt for the reversion budget, when it became clear that the House 
would not have any means to intervene in the current budget implementation. For the 
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2005, 2007, and 2008 budgets, the resources for distribution diminished as the share of 
obligatory and automatic appropriation increased. It should be noted that 2004 (in which 
year the budget making was for the 2005 fiscal year) was a special year as President 
Arroyo declared a fiscal crisis, and she did not exercise the partial veto. Our model 
would lead us to expect that the 2005 and 2007 budgets would not be enacted. But these 
budgets were enacted because the players seemed to be apprehensive concerning the 
cost of losing confidence in various quarters and feared a shortage of funds for new 
projects if the budget enactment were to fail repeatedly.  
 
If we look at the budget making process year by year, we notice that four issues have 
always been given much attention by the players. These are first, the debt service, 
second, the congressional pork barrel, third, the President’s discretionary funds, and 
fourth, the introduction of provisions for requiring the Congress to intervene in the 
implementation phase. Every year, the Congress and the President repeated the same 
process: the Congress tried to increase the funding for pork barrel or for other local 
projects, and attempted to insert provisions to guaranteeing the release of funds for 
these projects; in return, the President exercised the partial veto to delete such revisions. 
Table 4 indicates the number of items for partial veto, the number of items to which 
conditions were attached for implementation, and the major points on which the veto 
was used. 
 
Table 4 The President’s Veto 
Fiscal 
Year 
Administration The Number 
of Vetoed 
Items 
The Number of 
the Items with 
Conditions 
The Major Vetoed Point(s) 
1995 Ramos 1 6 debt service  
1996 Ramos 9 11 debt service, contradiction with 
the policy of the current 
administration  
1997 Ramos 16 11 debt service, restrictions over 
the President’s discretion 
1998 Ramos 9 21 debt service, restrictions over 
the President’s discretion 
1999 Estrada 1 1 debt service 
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2000 Estrada 52 10 debt service, requirement for 
the Congressional concurrence, 
restriction on the President’s 
power to hold the fund release 
2001 Estrada / 
Arroyo 
No budget *** *** 
2002 Arroyo 10 21 Items to give discretion to 
some offices for fund use. 
restriction on the President’s 
power to hold the fund release 
2003 Arroyo 9 25 General provision to set the 
priority order on fund release 
2004 Arroyo No budget *** *** 
2005 Arroyo 0 0 No veto  
2006 Arroyo No budget *** *** 
2007 Arroyo 14 23 Giving the government offices 
the authority to use their own 
revenue. Rationalization of 
government organizations. 
Restrictions on foreign assisted 
projects 
2008 Arroyo 17 31 Pork barrel, debt service 
Source: The Author, based on the President’s Veto Messages. 
 
The first issue, that of debt service, concerns attempts by the Congress to revise the bill 
by transferring funds from debt repayment to local level projects. The Congress cannot 
merely increase the funds for local projects because of the ceiling imposed by the 
President. Therefore, the Congress needs to look for a source of available funds for 
transfer. The House tends to identify the debt service allocation as a likely source, as the 
country’s need to maintain a credible commitment to foreign creditors has little 
significance for the House’s members. In the terms employed in the theoretical model, 
this is an action to increase 1 െ ߨ within the budget constraints. On such occasions, the 
President usually exercises a partial veto and restores the original expenditure that has 
been earmarked for debt servicing. This can be done because the Presidential Decree No. 
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1177 provides for automatic appropriation for debt service. After the partial veto is 
imposed, the amount that has been automatically calculated is inserted into the 
expenditure program. Under the Ramos administration, the total amount of the budget 
sometimes exceeded the President’s proposal, because the President exercised the 
partial veto on the debt service just after Congress made the transfer of funds. The 
increased funds for local projects were not touched by the President. Hence, the total 
amount ballooned19. At any rate, the President has been able to follow his or her 
intention and restore the expenditure intended for servicing the debt.  
 
The second issue, the bargaining over pork barrel funds, takes place between the 
President and the House, as well as between the Senate and the House. In essence, 
senators need pork barrel funds to attract the support of local officials for their election. 
But, when the media in 1996 started focusing on the anomalies and corruption issues 
associated with pork barrel funding, senators emphasized their anti-pork barrel stance 
and tried to slash the funds in the budget. The senators’ strategic calculation seemed to 
be that a clean image is more effective than pork barrel spending in impressing the 
national constituency. Conflicts over this issue between the Senate and the House 
delayed enactment of the budgets in 1997 and 2000. For its part, the House has strongly 
resisted attempts to abolish pork barrel expenditure. The President could not slash the 
pork barrel funds drastically since slashing the funds deprives him of a means to control 
the House through the release of funds. Past Presidents, however, seem to have made 
the distribution ratio closer to their preferred level at the implementation phase. The 
President’s leverage diminishes as the available funds for distribution decreases due to 
the widening fiscal deficit. The Estrada administration faced this problem. President 
Estrada faced a serious gridlock in bargaining due to the growing fiscal deficit. The 
conflict between the President and the House led to delay and failure of enactment, and 
eventually contributed to the downfall of the administration. This is the cost for the 
President imposed by the House when the President increases the payoff at the expense 
of that of the House, which is the aforementioned ܥሺߨ௉ሻ.  
 
President Estrada promised to abolish the provision of pork barrel funds during his 
campaign for the 1997 Presidential election. As it happened, he did not need to rely on 
                                                 
19 Some claim that such a situation is unconstitutional. The House also discussed a bill 
to repeal the Presidential Decree No. 1177. Nonetheless, the decree was not repealed 
and the situation has not yet changed. 
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pork barrel funds, because his popularity amongst the voters was based on his personal 
appeal as a former movie actor. After he was elected President, he did not include pork 
barrel items in the budget proposal for the fiscal year 1999. The House strongly opposed 
the “no pork” budget, and created pork barrel items in the legislation process. The 
amendments introduced by the House were finally approved by the Senate, and then by 
the President. But the country’s fiscal circumstances were worsening as a result of the 
1997 Asian financial crisis (See Table 3), and the President needed to limit the release of 
funds to avoid further fiscal deterioration. The House reacted negatively to the 
President’s determination to reduce the actual release of funds, and the upshot was that 
for the fiscal year 2000 budget, the House boycotted the session to protest the 
President’s attempt to block the release of the pork barrel funds. In the end, the budget 
was enacted but final approval was delayed until February. In addition, the President 
vetoed 52 items in the appropriation act, a remarkable state of affairs that shows how 
serious the conflict had become. The following fiscal year 2001 budget was not 
approved because of the impeachment trial against President Estrada. In fact, the 
legislation process was delayed even before the impeachment process got under way 
because of the severe conflict between the President and the House over the budget 
proposal20. Aside from the proposal itself, the actual implementation of the current 
budget provides information on the prospective distribution rate,  ߨ,  of the budget 
proposal. The House determines its action by predicting the President’s future actions 
based on the current implementation. When it seems probable that the House will not be 
able to secure ߨ  which induces a new budget as equilibrium due to the possible 
President’s ex-post defection, the House chooses to reject the budget bill.  
 
The third and the fourth issues, namely the restriction governing the President’s 
discretionary funds and Congressional intervention in the release of funds, are 
demonstrative of executive-legislative competition in the implementation phase, and 
determine whether or not the President can revise the budget after the budget enactment. 
The restrictions governing the President’s discretionary funds includes the limitation of 
funding to the Presidential contingent funds, and whether the President can be prevented 
from controlling the release of funds. Congressional intervention at the implementation 
level includes the condition of requiring Congressional agreement for the release of 
                                                 
20 The House was not able to secure a quorum for convening a meeting of the 
Committee on Appropriations. This is a typical example of the boycott strategy of the 
House. 
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funds. In the fourteen budget making processes that we have examined, the Congress 
tried to insert the restrictions over the President’s discretion on eight occasions, and 
attempted to introduce provisions for intervention on seven occasions. All these 
attempts, however, were nullified by the President’s partial veto. In the end, the 
Congress always failed to establish control over the President in the implementation 
process.  
 
In sum, a typical series of events is as follows. The Congress tries to amend the 
President’s budget proposal to increase the share of spending on local level projects, 
 ሺ1 െ ߨሻ. For this purpose, the Congress attempts to reduce the amount of expenditure 
on servicing the national debt, and attempts to impose restrictions over the President’s 
discretionary funds. But, the President exercises the partial veto at the final stage and 
restores the original distribution ratio, ߨ. In the final stages, the President succeeds in 
enacting the budget on terms that are preferable for him. Furthermore, the President 
brings the budget closer to his ideal point at the implementation phase.  
 
On the other hand, if the allocation of funds to local level projects is smaller than the 
House is willing to tolerate, the Congress may reject (or veto) the budget and may 
choose to opt for reversion (to the previous year’s budget). The Congress also has the 
ability to impose costs on the President. These include sabotaging the session and the 
withdrawal of political support from the President. These latent threats by the Congress 
affect the degree to which the President can exercise a partial veto. In addition, the 
current implementation of the budget provides useful information for predicting the 
President’s future commitment to the allocation of funding.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has analyzed the relationship between political institutions and policy 
outcomes in the budget making process through focusing on the powers of institutional 
players, and has examined in particular the type of veto powers available to the 
President as well as the reversion point. Our research suggests that the power of partial 
veto favors the holder of veto power in the final outcomes, but that the reversion point is 
obtained if the total resources available at the reversion point are more than those on 
offer in the current budget proposal. The case of the Philippines, which we have 
examined in detail, supports our theoretical predictions. At the same time, we have also 
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obtained the important implication that the partial veto sets stricter conditions for the 
budget to be enacted, which is probably counter-intuitive.  
 
As mentioned above, political institutions are not the sole determinant of policy 
outcomes. Nonetheless, understanding the role of the political context is a crucial 
prerequisite for revealing the causal mechanisms at work in the policy process.  
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